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“Out of Zion Shall Go Forth the Law” 
(Isaiah 2:3)
Nathan Oman
Review of Edwin B. Firmage and Richard C. Mangrum. Zion in the 
Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 1830–1900. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988. xvii + 
430 pp., with index and bibliography. $27.50.
Religion and the State
Then went the Pharisees, and took counsel how they 
might entangle him in his talk. And they sent out unto him 
their disciples with the Herodians, saying . . . Tell us there-
fore, What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto 
Caesar, or not? But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and 
said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Shew unto me the 
tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny. And 
he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscrip-
tion? They say unto him, Caesar’s. Then saith he unto them, 
Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; 
and unto God the things that are God’s. (Matthew 22:15–21)
Christ’s answer to the Pharisees and the Herodians frames one of the major questions of political and legal theory: what is the 
proper relationship between religion and the state? Perhaps because 
he perceived the hypocrisy and insincerity of his interlocutors, Christ 
did not offer a complete answer to the question. The state and reli-
gion both have legitimate spheres, but beyond taxes and currency, 
Christ’s answer does not inform us how far the intersection between 
those two spheres extends or if they intersect at all. The restoration 
has offered some fascinating and sometimes radical answers to this 
question.
In 1842, Joseph Smith declared, “We believe in being subject to 
kings, presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and 
sustaining the law” (Article of Faith 12). However, alongside this 
avowal of religious submissiveness to secular authority, the Prophet 
also laid out a radical program of “the literal gathering of Israel” and 
a prediction “that Zion (the New Jerusalem) will be built upon the 
American continent” (Article of Faith 10).1 He also affirmed an expan-
sive notion of religious liberty. “We claim the privilege of worship-
ing Almighty God according to the dictates of our own conscience, 
and allow all men the same privilege, let them worship how, where, 
or what they may” (Article of Faith 11). Thus from the beginning the 
church has had an ambiguous relationship with the state. It affirms 
loyalty and obedience but insists on the right of the Saints to pur-
sue the peculiar vision of Zion dictated by revelation. The refusal of 
Mormons to yield ultimate obedience to the norms of others and the 
dictates of the state has brought them into frequent conflict with the 
law. The story of these encounters and the Mormon attempt to create 
gospel-based alternatives to the secular courts makes for one of the 
most fascinating chapters in church history. At the same time, the ac-
count contains powerful insights into the nature of law and the state, 
and their relationship to religion. In Zion in the Courts, Firmage and 
Mangrum tackle this story. Although their work is not without limi-
tations, it lays out for the first time a comprehensive look at the nine-
teenth-century legal experience of the Latter-day Saints. The result is 
an impressive piece of scholarship full of possibilities for later students.
 1. The original text of the Wentworth Letter, from which the Articles of Faith are 
taken, reads “That Zion will be built upon this continent.” The wording was slightly clari-
fied in the canonized text. See “Appendix 12: The Wentworth Letter,” in The Encyclopedia 
of Mormonism, 4:1754. 
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Much of the freshness of this volume comes from the fact that 
neither Firmage nor Mangrum is a historian by training. Both are law 
professors. Mangrum studied law at the University of Utah, Oxford, 
and Harvard and currently teaches at Creighton Law School, where 
he specializes in jurisprudence and church-state issues. Firmage is the 
Samuel D. Thurmond Professor of Law at the Univer-sity of Utah, 
teaching international and constitutional law. He received his edu-
cation at Brigham Young University and the University of Chicago. 
Thus both authors are grounded in the law rather than traditional 
historiography, and the results can be seen in their work.
Zion in the Courts is divided into three main sections. The first 
section chronicles the years from 1830 to 1844. The second section 
deals with the massive legal battle the church fought with the federal 
government over the practice of plural marriage. The final portion 
focuses on the system of ecclesiastical courts that sought to serve all 
Mormon judicial needs in the nineteenth century. All of these themes 
have been treated by other authors.2 The innovation of Firmage and 
Mangrum is their close attention to legal detail and (in the case of 
ecclesiastical courts) the sheer breadth of their study. They explain 
legal actions in great detail (see pp.-120–24),3 examine the full im-
pact of judicial decisions (see pp.-185–94),4 and look into the role of 
ecclesiastical courts on issues ranging from definitions of adultery un-
der polygamy (see pp.-357–58) to fishing rights on Utah Lake (see p. 
285). Although the wealth of detail can be overwhelming at times, on 
the whole the authors avoid useless pedantry and pointless catalog-
ing of legal minutiae. Instead, one is left with a sense of precisely how 
the restoration has interacted with, challenged, and been challenged 
Society), 137–40 (the trial of Joseph Smith in Missouri), and 193–98 (legal issues in 
Nauvoo). See also Leonard J. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom (Salt Lake City: University 
of Utah Press, 1993), 353–79, which discusses the federal “Raid” on polygamy. See also 
Raymond T. Swenson, “Resolution of Civil Disputes by Mormon Ecclesiastical Courts,” 
Utah Law Review 1978/3 (1978): 573–95.
 3. A detailed account of Joseph Smith’s bankruptcy.
 4. An analysis of the reduced evidentiary standards used against polygamists.
 5. See Steven H. Gifis, Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (Hauppauge, New York: Barron’s 
Educational Series, 1996), s.v. “Habeas Corpus.” 
Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts (Oman)  •  115
116  •  FARMS Review of Books 12/1 (2000)
by law and the state. The result is a rare feat in Mormon historical 
writing: Firmage and Mangrum provide a genuinely new approach to 
previously treated events without resorting to violent revisionism. In 
this review, I will summarize the basic content of Firmage and Man-
grum’s book, touching on what I see as some of the more interesting 
issues. Then I will offer a framework in which both the limitations 
and possibilities of this book can be understood.
Legal Experiences in the Early Church
Much of the early legal experience of the church revolved 
around lawsuits against the Prophet and his associates. Firmage and 
Mangrum lay out the early money-digging trial of Joseph Smith 
along with the initial attempts in New York to silence him using the 
law against disorderly persons (see pp. 48–50). Unfortunately, the 
paucity of reliable sources for these early suits means that the treat-
ment is necessarily truncated. The legal experience in Ohio included 
litigation surrounding the failure of the Kirtland Safety Society (see 
pp. 54–58). In a harbinger of more ominous things to come in Mis-
souri, Joseph Smith also sued leaders of anti-Mormon mobs for as-
sault. Unlike in Missouri, however, “the Saints generally received fair 
treatment in the Ohio courts” (p.-54).
While “in Ohio, at least, the Saints were willing to present their 
complaints before the gentile courts” (p. 52), the violence of Mis-
souri’s mobs and the connivance of her public officials dramatically 
shifted Mormon attitudes. By the time the Saints were driven to 
Illinois, they had already suffered nearly a decade of illegal, semilegal, 
and legal persecution. Mobs had destroyed Mormon property and 
dreams in Missouri, Mormon leaders had been hounded with both 
legitimate and vexatious lawsuits, and appeals to state and national 
authorities had fallen largely on deaf ears. Firmage and Mangrum 
sum up the position of the Saints at the time:
 The disheartening Missouri episode created a resolve 
among Mormons to rely no longer on “gentile” government 
to protect their civil rights. Instead the Mormons turned in-
ward, forging a society that combined democratic and theo-
cratic elements of government that would provide for sub-
stantial autonomy, insularity, and self-sufficiency. In search 
of those objectives, the Saints developed Nauvoo into a sanc-
tuary arguably untouchable by state law. (p. 83)
An essential element of this autonomous sanctuary was the abil-
ity to halt and evaluate outside legal processes. The method used by 
church and civic leaders was the writ of habeas corpus. 
Habeas corpus is a Latin phrase literally meaning “produce the 
body.” It is a particular kind of writ or order issued by a court to a 
government official who is holding someone prisoner. The writ de-
mands that the official bring his prisoner before the court (i.e., “pro-
duce the body”) and show legal cause for his incarceration. It thus 
provides judicial review of executive action, insuring that a prisoner 
can challenge the government’s action in court. Traditionally, habeas 
corpus has been known as “the Great Writ” because it formed the ba-
sis for a government of law rather than caprice.5
Under the Nauvoo charter, the municipal court, which consisted 
of prominent church leaders, had the right to issue writs of habeas 
corpus, and “this provision of the charter logically became the fore-
most weapon in the Mormons’ protectionist arsenal” (p.-93). Fir-
mage and Mangrum point out that most city charters of the time 
contained identical habeas corpus provisions, belying the claims of 
some that Mormons expressly lobbied for the writ in order to com-
pletely exclude outside law from Nauvoo (see p. 93). Nevertheless, 
they chronicle the imaginative use that Mormon lawyers made of the 
writ in protecting the Saints—and Joseph Smith in particular—from 
gentile law.
The central legal problem for the Saints was that Joseph Smith 
was technically a fugitive from justice (see p. 77). He had been 
charged and imprisoned in Missouri on grounds of treason, mur-
der, and robbery. Despite his incarceration in Liberty Jail, Joseph had 
 6. Ellipsis points in original.
 7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 at 53 (1905).
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never been formally tried for any of these offenses. Thus he was sub-
ject to extradition and trial in Missouri, a trial that most Mormons 
believed would lead to his murder. The precariousness of the Proph-
et’s legal position increased after Missouri officials blamed him for 
the attempted assassination of Lilburn Boggs (see p.-95). Beginning 
in September of 1840, state officials from Missouri began a series of 
attempts to arrest Joseph. At first he simply dodged the arresting of-
ficers, but after the governor of Illinois intervened to ensure Joseph’s 
arrest, his lawyers sought a legal way of defeating the extradition (see 
p. 94).
Their first success with habeas corpus came before gentile Judge 
Stephen A. Douglas, who ruled that the writ for Joseph’s arrest was 
technically invalid (see p. 94). Thereafter, the Nauvoo municipal 
court used its power to issue writs of habeas corpus each time Joseph 
was arrested. In addition, the city council took action to increase the 
scope and breadth of the writ’s reach. First, they insisted that the 
Nauvoo municipal court had the power to examine all arrests, even 
those not carried out by municipal officials. Second, the council 
passed a law dramatically expanding the depth of local inquiry under 
habeas corpus.
It allowed the municipal court to look into the procedural 
correctness and legality of any writ of process, foreign or lo-
cal, and also (if the court concluded that the writ of process 
was procedurally valid) to “then proceed and fully hear the 
merits of the case, upon which said arrest was made, upon 
such evidence as may be produced and sworn before said 
court.” If upon investigation the municipal court concluded 
that the writ of process has been issued “through private 
pique, malicious intent, or religious .-.-. persecution, false-
hood or representation,” then the court could quash the writ. 
(pp. 97–98)6
This law gave Nauvoo the power not only to see if an arrest was 
procedurally valid, but also to decide on its underlying worth and 
 8. The Supreme Court first dealt with the free-exercise clause in Permoli v. 
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justice. In effect, the Saints were claiming the right to exclude the op-
eration of what they perceived as unjust laws from their community. 
Mangrum and Firmage devote some time to a discussion of the law’s 
validity. Although they conclude that it may well have exceeded tra-
ditional notions of habeas corpus, they do acknowledge the existence 
of a precedent at the time for expanded use of the writ (see p. 99). 
However, despite any legal merit inherent in the Mormons’ position, 
the authors argue that their use of habeas corpus contributed to the 
public outcry that led to Joseph’s murder at Carthage (see p. 113).
Beyond the Mormon quest for immediate protection from legal 
harassment by enemies, Firmage and Mangrum also delve into how 
efforts to live the law of consecration fared before the bar of secular 
courts. In many ways the lawsuits arising out of Mormon attempts 
at communal economic activity are philosophically much more sig-
nificant than the high-stakes, habeas corpus maneuvering in Nauvoo. 
The actions in Nauvoo were ultimately ad hoc attempts to protect 
Joseph from extradition to Missouri. While they had potentially 
life-or-death outcomes, the crisis conditions under which they were 
adopted were less directly tied to theology or fundamental issues of 
legal theory. That was not so in the law of consecration cases. Clas-
sical liberal theorists have traditionally exalted the role of legally en-
forceable contracts as one of the hallmarks of freedom. The ability of 
autonomous individuals to forge binding agreements supposedly al-
lows them to create their own voluntary business arrangements. For a 
brief period around the turn of the century, the Supreme Court even 
extended constitutional protection to economic agreements, declar-
ing that “the general right [of a citizen] to make a contract in relation 
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”7 Despite this 
latent respect for contract in American thought and jurisprudence, 
the church was unable to make the law of consecration legally palat-
able to “gentile” judges. 
During the first fourteen years of the church’s existence, the 
Saints obeyed a series of revelations calling for communal economic 
Municipality No. 1. 44 U.S. 589 (1845). The case dealt with a municipal ordinance that, for 
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arrangements. Firmage and Mangrum go into the details of how 
members formally deeded property to the church and received their 
stewardships in return. They summarize the legal results of the law of 
consecration thus:
Basic theological principles lay behind this law: possessions 
belonged to the Lord; and spiritual commitment required 
the individual to give priority to the Kingdom of God over 
materialistic desires. But implementing these ideals in a le-
gally enforceable arrangement proved more problematic; the 
law would not accommodate Zion. (pp. 61–62)
Legal problems arose in three ways. First, wealthy members who 
had “cold feet” about consecration would sue the church for the re-
turn of their property. The secular law, unwilling to recognize the 
legitimacy of the church’s claim to consecrated property, would side 
with the disgruntled members. At the other end of the economic 
spectrum, there were those members who wished to apostatize from 
the church and take their stewardships with them. In these cases, 
secular authorities would again side against the church. Finally, the 
church wished to retain an interest in any stewardship so that it could 
adjust the size of individual grants to accommodate new members 
or special circumstances. However, the secular law was wedded to a 
more traditional concept of property and once again refused to up-
hold the church’s position (see pp. 61–63).
Plural Marriage and the Law
The fiercest legal opposition to the church, however, had to wait 
until the Saints emigrated to Utah and the Mountain West. After 
the church publicly announced the practice of polygamy in 1852, 
the church became the target of increasingly harsh legislation from 
the federal government. Beginning with the Republican platform of 
1856—which declared polygamy, along with slavery, to be one of 
“the twin relics of barbarism”—national opinion began to galvanize 
against the church (see p. 129). In 1862 the first of a long series of 
laws was passed to punish Mormon polygamists (see p. 131).
The story of the federal government’s persecution of Mormons 
health reasons, forbade open-casket funerals except in the city mortuary. Since this law ef-
fectively outlawed Roman Catholic requiem masses, Permoli challenged it, claiming that 
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between 1862 and 1890 is one of the great legal dramas of United 
States history. It pitted the combined displeasure of the entire coun-
try against a small but tenacious minority. The lengths to which the 
federal government went in attacking the church illustrate the extent 
to which legal and constitutional protections can prove inadequate. 
Ironically, most members of the church today are unaware that at 
one point in time, the annihilation of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints was a stated policy goal of the federal government. 
Unlike the haphazard but violent mobs in Missouri and Illinois, the 
antipolygamy crusades prior to 1890 represented a deliberate deci-
sion of the United States government made by presidents, congresses, 
and the Supreme Court. The Saints challenged these actions in fed-
eral court, forcing the Supreme Court to issue a string of decisions 
that—for better or for worse—laid the basic structure of religious 
liberty jurisprudence in America.
The problem began with polygamy. The church accepted it as a 
divinely inspired institution. The federal government insisted that 
it was an immoral and degrading practice that had to be eradicated. 
However, the Civil War and its aftermath engaged the attention of 
the nation for the first few years after the passage of the first anti-
polygamy law, and it remained a dead letter. The Saints assumed that 
the law violated their first amendment right to the free exercise of re-
ligion, and the federal government did not press the matter.
However, after the war, federal officials began to step up their ef-
forts to punish polygamists. In 1874, Congress passed the Poland Act, 
which eliminated some procedural obstacles to convicting polyga-
mists. The law signaled a change in federal policy. The government 
was discarding the live-and-let-live attitude that had prevailed during 
the Civil War and Reconstruction years in favor of a vigorous attack 
on polygamy. The church decided to test the matter. The test case, 
Reynolds v. United States, was a landmark case because for the first 
time the Supreme Court directly interpreted the meaning of the free-
exercise clause of the first amendment.8 Firmage and Mangrum do 
an admirable job in explaining the two written decisions in this case, 
but their treatment is not without faults. Unfortunately, Mangrum 
and Firmage rely almost exclusively on the court records to recon-
struct these events (see pp.-151–56). The absence of other outside 
sources—such as diaries and letters by the participants—leaves con-
siderable doubt as to the nature of the out-of-court maneuvering. 
Reynolds was the secretary to the First Presidency and also a polyga-
mist. The church seems to have struck a deal with federal prosecu-
tors in order to test the constitutionality of the antipolygamy laws 
(see p. 151). Reynolds apparently provided evidence to convict him-
self with the understanding that prosecutors would not seek a stiff 
sentence. When the federal officers pushed for a long prison sentence 
anyway, Reynolds vigorously fought the case (see p. 151).
The Supreme Court’s decision opened the floodgates of federal 
persecution. The Court held that the Poland Act was constitutional, 
notwithstanding Reynolds’s objections. Chief Justice Waite stated:
Congress was deprived [by the free-exercise clause] of all leg-
islative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach 
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive 
of good order.9
The court thus announced a narrow view of the free exercise of 
religion by creating a dichotomy between belief and action that pro-
tected only belief. In so doing, the justices harked back to the cramped 
religious theory of Thomas Jefferson (see p. 154).10 Jefferson saw the 
right to free exercise as being a very limited concept that protected 
only belief. He had argued that “the legislative powers of government 
reach actions . . . and not opinions.”11 Unfortunately, in Jefferson’s 
it violated his right to free exercise of his religion. However, prior to the passage of the 
fourteenth amendment after the Civil War, the Bill of Rights applied only to federal ac-
tions. Thus, in Permoli the Court disposed of the free-exercise claim by pointing out that 
it couldn’t be applied to a city ordinance. Since the polygamy law challenged in Reynolds 
was a federal law applied to the territories, it avoided the issue of the states’ relationship 
to the Bill of Rights.
 9. 98 U.S. at 164 (1878).
 10. Cf. ibid.
 11. Thomas Jefferson, Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Library of 
America, 1984), 510.
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view only belief enjoyed constitutional protection. In practical terms, 
the decision gave the government virtually unlimited power to crimi-
nalize any behavior it found objectionable. Mormon polygamists dis-
covered that the first amendment would not protect them, and Rey-
nolds went to prison (see p. 156).
After the Reynolds case settled the major constitutional question, 
prosecution against polygamists accelerated. There were two basic 
obstacles to government victory in polygamy cases. The first was the 
problem of Mormon control of the courts. The Utah Territorial leg-
islature had granted broad jurisdiction to local probate courts that 
traditionally dealt only with cases involving wills and were staffed 
almost exclusively with Mormon judges. Since these courts had the 
ability to issue writs of habeas corpus and try criminal cases, they 
could effectively frustrate any polygamy prosecution. Congress re-
sponded by dismantling the local court system in 1874 (see p. 141). 
All criminal cases were thrown into the federal courts, which were 
firmly in the control of non-Mormons. More important, in 1882, 
Congress excluded all Mormons from jury duty. When a member of 
the church challenged this law as unconstitutional, the Court upheld 
Congress’s action in Clawson v. United States (see pp. 227–29).12
The second barrier to convicting polygamists was the nature 
of the offense itself. The crime of “bigamy” consisted of being mar-
ried to two or more persons simultaneously. The law required proof 
of a marriage ceremony to convict. Mormon marriages, conducted 
in temples or endowment houses, were almost impossible to prove. 
Congress reacted by creating a new offense: “unlawful cohabitation.” 
The proof of this offense did not require evidence of an actual 
marriage ceremony (see p. 161). But what it did require was very 
unclear. Mormon attorneys argued that the threshold should be proof 
of sexual intercourse (see p. 169). However, this would have imposed 
the same kind of evidentiary problems as bigamy. The courts refused 
to accept this interpretation with the result “that proving the offense 
 12. See 114 U.S. 477 (1885).
 13. See 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
 14. Mircea Eliade, Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism, trans. Philip 
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[of cohabitation] became ridiculously easy for federal prosecutors” 
(p. 174). Any contact between a man and his wives became evidence 
of cohabitation. Thus Mormon men who attempted to obey the law 
after the Reynolds decision by ceasing to live with their plural families 
would still be prosecuted if they provided financial support to them 
(see p.-175). 
Even more fascinating, the courts created evidentiary rules that 
in practice destroyed the presumption of innocence in cohabitation 
proceedings. For evidentiary purposes, a man was presumed to co-
habit with his legal (i.e., first) wife (see p. 186). However, in a case 
where a subsequent wife had children but the first wife did not, a 
man trying to avoid prosecution would often live with his children. 
The presumption of cohabitation with his legal wife put the man in 
the position of having to prove that he was innocent of the charge. 
Finally, the courts so diluted the amount of evidence necessary to 
establish cohabitation that a man could be convicted entirely on 
the basis of reputation without any corroborating evidence at all (see 
pp. 189–90).
The decisive federal attack came in 1887 with the Edmunds-
Tucker Act. No longer content to prosecute polygamists, this act 
aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the church as an insti-
tution (see p. 257). The territorial law that gave the church its legal 
existence was revoked, and all church property in excess of $50,000 
was to be confiscated by the government (see p. 201). Federal mar-
shals and prosecutors moved in. The federal government seized huge 
amounts of church property, including Temple Square. The church 
tried to protect its assets by creating dummy corporations or deeding 
property to loyal church members. These attempts proved partially 
successful, but the government continued to relentlessly locate and 
seize church property. In a case whose name seemed to summarize 
the era, The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. United States,13 the Supreme Court upheld the Edmunds-
Tucker Act, giving the government the final go-ahead to completely 
dismantle the church (see p. 257).
In the face of this relentless pressure and the almost certain an-
Mairet (London: Harvill, 1991), 28–29.
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nihilation of the church, President Wilford Woodruff received a rev-
elation authorizing the discontinuation of plural marriage. The First 
Presidency issued the Manifesto in the October conference of 1890. 
With the retreat from polygamy, the federal government relented 
and eventually returned most of the church’s property (see p. 259). 
Firmage and Mangrum summarize the era by saying:
 In the battle of wills between the church and the federal 
government, the government was victorious. It suppressed 
polygamy and crippled the church’s political, social, and eco-
nomic power in the territory [of Utah]. Faced with a choice 
between a principled commitment to polygamy and survival 
as an organization, the church chose to survive. (p. 259)
Church Courts in the Nineteenth Century
The final section of the book deals with the ecclesiastical court 
system the church established in Utah. Unlike present-day church 
disciplinary councils, nineteenth-century church courts served as 
the primary forum for all civil disputes between the Saints. Thus, in 
addition to deciding on traditional moral issues such as adultery or 
apostasy, church courts also resolved contract disputes, property 
battles, and a host of other legal questions. While this section lacks 
some of the narrative appeal of the first two-thirds of the book, in 
many ways it is the most fascinating and potentially most important 
part of the work.
Firmage and Mangrum’s basic thesis is that the church court 
system reflected a distinctively gospel-centered alternative to secular 
courts. While traditional legal forums emphasized atomic individual-
ism, personal rights, and legal formality, the church courts placed far 
greater value on the concepts of community, charity, and substantive 
justice embodied in the restoration’s concept of Zion. Motivated by a 
desire to build up the kingdom of God on earth, the Saints voluntarily 
submitted to religious authority (see p. 261). The result was that for 
several decades, Mormonism operated what constituted an autono-
mous legal structure independent of state institutions and coercion.
Firmage and Mangrum marshal an impressive array of data in 
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defense of their argument. Ordinarily, records of church courts are 
kept confidential. Firmage and Mangrum gained special access to 
these materials, but only on the condition that the names of parties 
to the disputes be kept secret. Thus, with a few exceptions, all of the 
characters in the last section of the book are referred to only by their 
initials. One drawback of this system is that Firmage and Mangrum 
could not deepen their research with other primary sources such 
as letters or diaries. In order to preserve confidentiality, they con-
fine themselves almost exclusively to the disfellowshipment files in 
the Church Archives. However, because of their willingness to work 
within this constraint, they provide an impressive wealth of informa-
tion on the details of how church courts actually functioned.
What they reveal is an independent Mormon legal system. In the 
harsh environment of the Great Basin, the Saints were only able to 
survive through cooperative efforts directed by priesthood authority. 
This required, among other things, notions of water and land rights 
at serious odds with secular law. The Saints responded by simply cre-
ating their own system of water law (see p. 314) and real estate law 
(see p. 293). Priesthood authorities resolved the inevitable disputes 
that arose. The church was perfectly willing to tell members that they 
had to pay damages and take other remedial action when they vio-
lated the norms laid down by the church, even in cases where the secu-
lar law required a different result (see p.-265).
This legal independence was not confined to water and real es-
tate. Priesthood authorities adjudicated cases involving everything 
from assault to bankruptcy. The aim was to provide the Saints a way 
of resolving all of their disputes without “suing . . . before the un-
godly” (p. 263). Despite their willingness to impose real monetary 
judgments, church leaders were far more likely than their secular 
counterparts to temper their decisions with a concern for mercy and 
neighborliness. Time and again, Firmage and Mangrum record cases 
where church courts sought to accommodate both parties to a dis-
pute rather than impose a winner-takes-all solution. Likewise, church 
courts refused to allow cases to turn on legal technicalities. Instead, 
they sought to get to the central issues without a slavish devotion to 
procedural niceties (see pp. 274–75).
Mormon courts also dealt with distinctively Mormon issues that 
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couldn’t find a hearing in secular court. The church courts handled 
divorce proceedings involving plural families and the consequent 
custody agreements, alimony payments, and child support in cases 
where the parties had no standing in secular courts (see p. 332). The 
concept of eternal marriage created some interesting cases. Firmage 
and Mangrum record cases of wives seeking to divorce deceased hus-
bands so that they might be resealed to someone else. Some of these 
cases became very complicated:
In an 1878 case HP, who was married civilly to TP, requested 
that she be sealed to WD because her husband “treated her 
poorly and was not in good standing with the Church.” WD 
consented to the sealing, provided that HP would stay with 
her husband during his life. When TP died, HP requested 
that WD either furnish her a home or agree to a cancellation 
of the sealing so that she could be sealed to yet another party, 
JS, who insisted on the sealing as a condition for providing 
her with basic necessities. WD responded: “I am not in cir-
cumstances financially to comply with her request, but would 
have felt glad to have done it if it had been in my power, and 
if she feels desirous to be sealed to Brother [JS] under these 
circumstances if it can be done to be unsealed I am willing to 
relinquish my claim” (p. 332).
Church courts insisted on their authority to reconsider and revise 
civil decisions involving church members. “Suing before the ungodly” 
was deemed to be un-Christian-like conduct worthy of dis-fellow-
shipment (see p. 264). Generally, the procedure was for the defen-
dant in a civil suit to complain of the un-Christian-like conduct of 
the plaintiff to his bishop. The bishop would then convene a church 
court to consider the matter. The court would consider the entire dis-
pute and craft a final judgment. Oftentimes, the church court would 
actually side with the plaintiff in the civil suit, ordering the defendant 
to pay damages. However, in these cases the plaintiff would generally 
have to pay the defendant’s legal costs to atone for his un-Christian-
like conduct (see p. 266). Provided that both parties chose to abide 
by the judgment, the case would be closed (unless either side ap-
pealed). If either party refused to abide by the decision, however, he 
128  •  FARMS Review of Books 12/1 (2000)
would be disfellowshipped from the church (see p. 320).
This brings us to the question of enforcement. For a brief pe-
riod of time during the desperate days at Winter Quarters, church 
courts meted out “coercive sanctions” (p. 288). However, apart from 
this exception, participation in church courts was voluntary. They 
did not have the ability to seize property or physically coerce partici-
pants. Rather, they relied exclusively on their ability to disfellowship 
members, with its associated spiritual and social consequences (see p. 
288). In the few cases where nonmembers submitted their disputes to 
church courts, the courts required posting a bond that was forfeit if 
the parties did not abide by the decision (see p. 282). Thus Mormons 
were able to operate an autonomous legal system bereft of the kind 
of institutionalized violence demanded by classical liberal theory.
History and Religion
Zion in the Courts avoids the temptation to explain Mormon le-
gal experience in purely secular terms. The religious historian Mircea 
Eliade, writing about the general state of the history of religion, ob-
served that:
We wanted at all costs to present an objective history of reli-
gions, but we failed to bear in mind that what we were chris-
tening objectivity followed the fashion of thinking in our 
times. . . . Desirous to achieve by all means the prestige of 
a “science”, the history of religions has passed through all 
the crises of the modern scientific mind, one after another. 
Historians of religions have been successively—and some 
of them have not ceased to be—positivists, empiricists, ra-
tionalists or historicists. And what is more, none of the fash-
ions which in succession have dominated this study of ours, 
not one of the global systems put forward in explanation of 
the religious phenomenon, has been the work of a historian 
of religions; they have all derived from hypotheses advanced 
by eminent linguists, anthropologists, sociologists or ethnol-
ogists, and have been accepted in their turn by everyone, in-
cluding the historians of religions! . . .
. . . In short we have neglected this essential fact: that in the 
title of the “history of religions” the accent ought not to be 
upon the word history, but upon the word religions. For al-
though there are numerous ways of practising history—from 
the history of technics to that of human thought—there is 
only one way of approaching religion—namely, to deal with 
the religious facts.14
Mormon history presents the same temptation to disregard that 
which is distinctly Mormon in the search for “objective” explana-
tions. Fortunately, Firmage and Mangrum, to the extent that they 
offer explanations, are unabashedly theological in their arguments. 
The opening chapter of the book, entitled “Zion and the State,” 
makes the doctrinal concept of Zion the main vehicle of explana-
tion. The Saints, they argue, were seeking to establish an indepen-
dent community based on obedience to God’s commands (see p. ix). 
When that vision of Zion threatened secular authority and norms, 
the federal government reacted with massive persecution. Ultimately, 
the church, faced with the real threat of complete destruction, was 
allowed to relent on certain commitments (i.e., plural marriage and 
other distinctive practices). The church court system was likewise an 
outgrowth of this commitment to build an autonomous city of God. 
In their introduction, Firmage and Mangrum argue “as long as the 
Mormons held themselves responsible for building Zion, the church 
courts flourished, despite secular alternatives, much longer than any 
materialistic historical model would have predicted” (p. xvii). They 
also note the doctrinal continuity into the present. “For the Mormon 
today,” they point out, “Zion is not dead, even though many of the 
institutions of nineteenth-century Mormonism are gone or have 
been modified beyond recognition” (p. 371).
If Zion in the Courts has a weakness, it is the weakness that much 
of all historical writing shares. An old adage defines history as “one 
damn thing after another.” Writing in reaction against what he saw 
 2. See James B. Allen and Glen M. Leonard, The Story of the Latter-day Saints, 2nd 
ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1992), 123 (lawsuits provoked by the Kirtland Safety 
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as disciplinary overreaching, the German historian Jacob Burckhardt 
laid out a very modest goal for historians. “We shall . . . make no at-
tempt at system, nor lay any claim to ‘historical principles.’ On the 
contrary, we shall confine ourselves to observation.”15 However, most 
modern practitioners of history have greater ambitions. They wish 
to offer explanations as well as descriptions of events. For example, 
Leonard Arrington, who has been called “the patron of virtually all 
contemporary scholarship in the field of Mormon history,”16 insisted 
that his magnum opus “Great Basin Kingdom represents an attempt 
to give meaning to an American experience that often has been ob-
scured by sectarian controversy.”17 Thus most historians seek to do 
more than simply describe the past; they also wish to interpret it, 
show causes and effects, and attempt to portray “what really hap-
pened.” This is the genre of literature into which Zion in the Courts 
falls. 
There is nothing wrong with this approach in and of itself. Fir-
mage and Mangrum have done an excellent job of compiling a mas-
sive amount of material. The bibliography alone, which fills thirteen 
pages, is a major resource for anyone interested in law and the resto-
ration. As noted above, their explanations are interesting and avoid 
predictable pitfalls. However, at the risk of faulting the authors for 
not writing a book they did not set out to write, I think that Zion 
in the Courts suffers from an unwillingness to stray very far from a 
recitation of nineteenth-century facts. This may make it good his-
tory, but it ignores a host of important questions of legal and politi-
cal theory.
“Mormon Studies” and “Mormon Perspectives”
In a larger sense, part of my disappointment with Zion in the 
 15. Jacob C. Burckhardt, Reflections on History, trans. M. D. Hottinger (Indianapolis, 
Ind.: Liberty Fund, 1979), 32.
 16. Richard L. Bushman, Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism (Chicago, 
Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1984), vii.
 17. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, xxii.
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Courts stems from its basic approach to dealing with Mormonism. 
Mormon scholarship can flow in two paths that I would label as 
“Mormon studies” and “Mormon perspectives.” “Mormon studies” 
views Mormonism as subject matter. The aim is to examine LDS ex-
perience, doctrine, or scripture from within the framework of some 
other discipline so that we can understand what is “really” going 
on. This type of scholarship can take many forms and can be either 
faith building or faith destroying.18 Fawn Brodie’s attempt to explain 
Joseph Smith by supposedly revealing his inner psychological expe-
rience is an early and notorious example of this kind of writing.19 
However, much as they might resent being placed in the same cat-
egory as Brodie, the work of many faithful scholars fits into a simi-
lar pattern. For example, the recently published FARMS volume Book 
of Mormon Authorship Revisited: The Evidence for Ancient Origins20 
contains the work of philosophers, linguists, anthropologists, de-
mographers, statisticians, military historians, and other scholars, 
all of whom use their intellectual training to examine the Book of 
Mor-mon from within the framework of their respective disciplines. 
Although the authors plainly acknowledge the apologetic value of 
their work,21 they share with Brodie an approach that places Mor-
monism under the lens of an outside scholarly perspective. Thought-
ful scholars freely acknowledge the limitations of this approach. For 
example, Noel Reynolds argues in the introduction to Book of Mor-
mon Authorship Revisited that, despite the findings contained in that 
book, “science and logic can prove negative, but not positive, claims” 
about the Book of Mormon.22 
Beyond its conceptual limitations, however, the “Mormon stud-
ies” approach also contains spiritual dangers. This is because it must 
 18. I should also, in all fairness, add that it is often neither. There is much of 
“Mormon studies” that inflicts no harm beyond boredom and does no good other than 
“adding to the record.”
 19.  See Fawn M. Brodie, No Man Knows My History: The Life of Joseph Smith, the 
Mormon Prophet, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
 20. See Noel B. Reynolds, ed., Book of Mormon Authorship Revisited: The Evidence for 
Ancient Origins (Provo, Utah: FARMS, 1997).
 21. See ibid., 3–4.
 22. Ibid., 16.
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grant, at least provisionally, intellectual authority to some system of 
thought beyond the gospel. Thus, a linguist studying the Book of 
Mormon must privilege the categories of his or her discipline in or-
der to proceed. In most cases, this is innocuous because the catego-
ries of this or that discipline do not directly confront the gospel, and 
in any case the faithful scholar cedes ultimate intellectual fealty to 
the Lord and his revelations. However, it is naive to assume that any 
intellectual discipline’s pursuit of knowledge is always neutral vis-à-
vis the gospel. There can and will be conflicts between the truths of 
revelation and the assumptions of certain kinds of scholarly inquiry. 
Furthermore, there is the danger that use of scholarly tools—which 
requires the privileging of those tools—will breed habits of mind that 
reflexively privilege secular scholarship over the gospel. I must has-
ten to add that I am not attacking “Mormon studies” per se. Money 
may carry with it spiritual dangers (see Matthew 6:24), but that is no 
reason to not make a living or support one’s family. Scholarly tools 
can do much to elucidate our understanding of things Mormon. The 
spadework of diligent researchers produces mounds of valuable and 
insightful material. I simply wish to point out the limitations—and 
possible dangers—of approaching Mor-monism purely as an object 
of study.
“Mormon perspectives” takes a different approach to the re-
lationship of the gospel and the life of the mind. Rather than using 
scholarly tools as a way of classifying and understanding Mormonism, 
this approach seeks to use Mormonism as a lens with which to ex-
amine, understand, and perhaps critique existing theories. In a sense, 
this is a much more daring approach. Given the vast range of seem-
ingly trivial and uninteresting objects that scholars examine, offering 
up Mormonism as a potentially fruitful topic of study does not re-
quire a great deal of chutzpah. Obviously this is not always the case. 
The recent demand by Mormon scholars that the Book of Mormon 
be taken seriously as both an ancient record and a genuinely insight-
ful text certainly pushes the envelope of the current intellectual cli-
mate. Nevertheless, the “Mormon perspectives” approach ultimately 
requires greater daring than the “Mormon studies” approach. One 
suggests a possibly fruitful subtopic of study. The other suggests that 
the experience and doctrine of a relatively minor—by the world’s 
standards—religion can seriously challenge and engage in the great 
dialogue of our civilization. 
Mormonism remains—by the world’s standards—a young reli-
gion. Whether the next chapter of the restoration will be a continu-
ation of the current explosive growth or a winnowing of the wheat 
and the chaff remains to be seen. The church could well become “a 
new world faith” on the same scale as Islam or traditional Christian-
ity, as some sociologists contend.23 It could remain a relatively small 
dose of leaven and salt in a much larger sea of humanity. Regardless, 
the church is reaching the point where serious LDS students should 
awaken to the fact that Mormonism can offer more than an interest-
ing topic of study. It can also challenge and reshape the categories by 
which that study proceeds. In the end, such an approach may prove 
much more valuable than the patient accumulation of further studies 
of Mormon topics. The philosopher Thomas Kuhn has pointed out 
that science has not in fact proceeded and progressed by the grad-
ual accretion of further facts and knowledge. Rather, the most far-
reaching scientific inquiries have been those which have challenged 
and shifted entire paradigms rather than simply adding more experi-
ments within an existing framework.24
Clearly, not all Mormon writing and discussion falls neatly into a 
“Mormon studies” or “Mormon perspectives” category. Most Mormon 
writers do not think of themselves as providing either a “studies” 
or a “perspectives” approach. The work of competent scholars and 
students will contain a mixture of both. Mormonism can be stud-
ied as a topic even while it challenges the way that study proceeds. 
Nevertheless, the categories are useful in that they ask students to 
evaluate what the ambitions and implications of their work are.
Zion in the Courts could have been a much more ambitious 
work. Certainly it contains the possibility for more ambitious work. 
 23. Rodney Stark, “The Rise of a New World Faith,” Review of Religious Research 26 
(September 1984): 18–27.
 24. See generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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The book follows a “Mormon studies” approach. The legal experi-
ence of the Latter-day Saints is subject matter, and the authors do an 
admirable job of bringing their scholarly expertise to the examina-
tion of that subject. Yet Mormon legal experience can be more than 
grist for the disciplinary mill of legal history. It can also be a chal-
lenge to developed and developing theories of the law. Zion in the 
Courts uses the law to examine Mormonism. Its weakness is that it 
is timid about using Mormonism to examine the law. The material 
amassed by Firmage and Mangrum invites one to reexamine basic 
questions about the relationship of religion and law and of law and 
the state. How should the state react to religious communities that 
refuse to give final allegiance to secular authority? How far can or 
should the free exercise of religion be taken? Can law exist divorced 
from the state? If it can, what does the concept of law mean in these 
cases? These are important and basic questions in jurisprudence. If 
the nineteenth-century legal experience of the Latter-day Saints sug-
gests anything, it is the possibility for the gospel to offer unique and 
challenging answers to these questions.
It is unlikely that we will ever have an official or even quasi-official 
Mormon legal theory. Most likely it is not even desirable to have one. 
Official Mormon doctrine will always remain under the control of 
the Lord and his prophets, and thus far their messages have focused 
on weightier topics. Still, it is not too much to hope that we might 
develop an autonomous Mormon legal and political theory. The goal 
need not be to use the gospel to find the “right” answers to questions 
of political philosophy or jurisprudence. Rather, it can be to use the 
gospel to challenge the questions and answers of the disciplines to find 
new and unique insights and formulations. Some writers have already 
begun to lay what could be the foundations of Mormon jurispru-
dence.25 Harvard Law School currently has an institute devoted to the 
study of Islamic jurisprudence. A century or two hence—provided 
of course that God does not wrap up history earlier—might not 
 25. See, for example, R. Collin Mangrum, “Mormonism, Philosophical Liberalism, 
and the Constitution,” BYU Studies 27/3 (1987): 119–37. See also Frederick Geddicks, 
“Towards an LDS Understanding of Church Autonomy,” Report to the Second American/
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students devote similar energy to understanding Mormon perspec-
tives on the law? If they do, Zion in the Courts will be one of their 
seminal texts. We can only hope that there will be many others.
European Conference on Religious Freedom, University of Trier, Germany, 17 May 1999, 
available at www.netoriginals.com/oman/LDSpapers.html. See also Cole Durham and 
Nathan Oman, “A Mormon Theory of Church and State in the Twentieth Century,” chap-
ter in a book forthcoming from De Paul University.
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